Variational inequality formulation of a class of multi-leader-follower games
DOI10.1007/s10957-011-9901-8zbMath1231.91049OpenAlexW2132812572MaRDI QIDQ662864
Publication date: 13 February 2012
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/151706
variational inequalityNash equilibrium problemmulti-leader-follower gamederegulated electricity market model
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
Related Items (11)
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