Efficiency-inducing tax credits for charitable donations when taxpayers have heterogeneous behavioral norms

DOI10.1007/978-981-19-0515-5_2MaRDI QIDQ6629176FDOQ6629176

Authors: Ngo Van Long 

Publication date: 29 October 2024

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

tax creditsKantian equilibriumcategorical imperativeKant-Nash equilibriumKantian behaviorvoluntary contributions to a public good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Kantian equilibrium
• Kant-Nash equilibria in a quantity-setting oligopoly
• A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players

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