SoK: public key encryption with openings
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Publication:6635892
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617925 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617928 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5009203 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256784 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1302835 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1302836 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 503347 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1942416 (Why is no real title available?)
- A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Almost tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions \& leakages in the standard model
- Anonymous public key encryption under corruptions
- Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*
- Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks
- Equivalence between Semantic Security and Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
- Foundations of Cryptography
- How to share a secret
- Indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext verification attack revisited: the complete picture
- Multi-key authenticated encryption with corruptions: reductions are lossy
- Non-malleability under selective opening attacks: implication and separation
- On Hiding a Plaintext Length by Preencryption
- On fingerprinting attacks and length-hiding encryption
- On the impossibility of tight cryptographic reductions
- Possibility and Impossibility Results for Encryption and Commitment Secure under Selective Opening
- Possibility and impossibility results for receiver selective opening secure PKE in the multi-challenge setting
- Possibility and impossibility results for selective decommitments
- Secure Hybrid Encryption from Weakened Key Encapsulation
- Selective Opening Security for Receivers
- Simulation-based bi-selective opening security for public key encryption
- Simulation-based receiver selective opening CCA secure PKE from standard computational assumptions
- Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions
- Standard security does not imply indistinguishability under selective opening
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- Standard versus selective opening security: separation and equivalence results
- Tightly CCA-secure encryption scheme in a multi-user setting with corruptions
- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange
- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange, revisited
- Tightness subtleties for multi-user PKE notions
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