SoK: public key encryption with openings
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Publication:6635892
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-57728-4_2MaRDI QIDQ6635892FDOQ6635892
Authors: Carlo Brunetta, Hans Heum, Martijn Stam 
Publication date: 12 November 2024
Cites Work
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- Anonymous public key encryption under corruptions
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