How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

DOI10.3982/QE2315MaRDI QIDQ6646152zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Pranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Anusha Nath

Publication date 29 November 2024

Published in Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

votingpublic goodswelfare programsclientelism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism
• Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India

Cited in

(1)

• How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

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