A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:6650205)
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Bertrand model of pricing and entry
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- A distributional framework for matched employer employee data
- A model of the international monetary system
- A sparsity-based model of bounded rationality
- A theory of non-Bayesian social learning
- An experiment on network density and sequential learning
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Asymptotic Inference about Predictive Ability
- Auctions of Shares
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Banking, trade, and the making of a dominant currency
- Bayesian Implementation
- Bayesian learning in social networks
- Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Communication and influence
- Communication with unknown perspectives
- Community detection and stochastic block models: recent developments
- Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
- Competitive one-to-one promotions
- Continuous implementation
- Correlation neglect in belief formation
- Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity
- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- End of 9-endings, price recall, and price perceptions
- Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
- Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- Extensive imitation is irrational and harmful
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Firming Up Inequality*
- Forward and spot exchange rates in a multi-currency world
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3942782 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 858900 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Information acquisition and use by networked players
- Information acquisition and welfare in network games
- Information diffusion in networks through social learning
- International liquidity and exchange rate dynamics
- Is econometrics useful for private policy making? A case study of replacement policy at an auto rental company
- IV quantile regression for group-level treatments, with an application to the distributional effects of trade
- Learning from Neighbours
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Monetary policy and the predictability of nominal exchange rates
- Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding
- Multidimensional Social Learning
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Network games with incomplete information
- Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes
- Non-Bayesian social learning
- Notes on optimal transportation
- Old boys' clubs and upward mobility among the educational elite
- Oligopolistic pricing and advertising
- Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks
- Opinion exchange dynamics
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimizing information in the herd: Guinea pigs, profits, and welfare
- Peer-confirming equilibrium
- Personalized pricing and advertising: an asymmetric equilibrium analysis
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
- Preferences, homophily, and social learning
- Public goods in networks
- Rare Disasters and Exchange Rates *
- Rational groupthink
- Rationally Inattentive Seller: Sales and Discrete Pricing
- Reaching a Consensus
- Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model*
- Referral-based Job Search Networks
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Social and economic networks.
- Social learning equilibria
- Social learning in a changing world
- Social learning with private and common values
- Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Products
- Strategic trading in informationally complex environments
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- Supermodular mechanism design
- Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent1
- Targeting Interventions in Networks
- The allocation of talent and U.S. economic growth
- The economics of data externalities
- The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment
- The price of polarization: Estimating task prices under routine‐biased technical change
- The Role of Portfolio Constraints in the International Propagation of Shocks
- The Taxation of Superstars*
- Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets
- U.S. monetary policy and the global financial cycle
- Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates
- Using out-of-sample mean squared prediction errors to test the martingale difference hypothesis
- Wages and human capital in finance: international evidence, 1970--2011
- When strong ties are strong: networks and youth labour market entry
- Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
- Why are so many goods priced to end in nine? And why this practice hurts the producers
- Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
- Word-of-mouth learning.
- Workplace heterogeneity and the rise of West German wage inequality
Cited in
(5)
This page was built for publication: A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6650205)
