Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.005zbMATH Open1279.91052OpenAlexW1994758264MaRDI QIDQ665108FDOQ665108

Authors: Juan-Miguel Gracia 

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.005

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpublic goodsLindahl allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations
• Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism

Cited In (4)

• Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
• A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
• Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
• A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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