Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.003zbMATH Open1279.91014OpenAlexW2059556323MaRDI QIDQ665116FDOQ665116

Authors: C. Chameni Nembua 

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31249/1/MPRA_paper_31249.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuenull player axiomTU-gamesmarginal contributionsingle valued solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

Cited In (22)

• The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik
• Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
• The class of efficient linear symmetric values for games in partition function form
• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
• Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
• Axioms of invariance for TU-games
• Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
• The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations
• The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
• Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application
• On membership and marginal values
• The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• Recursive and bargaining values
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games
• On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
• Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games
• A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
• Solidarity and fair taxation in TU games
• Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games
• Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
• On a class of solidarity values

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