Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
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Publication:665834
DOI10.1007/s10436-007-0087-xzbMath1233.91167MaRDI QIDQ665834
René van den Brink, Pieter H. M. Ruys
Publication date: 6 March 2012
Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-007-0087-x
hierarchy; cooperative production; labor complementarity; optimal firm size; organization of the firm; pay-system; positional wages
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
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