Technology driven organizational structure of the firm

DOI10.1007/s10436-007-0087-xzbMath1233.91167MaRDI QIDQ665834

René van den Brink, Pieter H. M. Ruys

Publication date: 6 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-007-0087-x

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchy; cooperative production; labor complementarity; optimal firm size; organization of the firm; pay-system; positional wages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

Related Items

Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications, Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation, Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value

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