Effect of heterogeneous sub-populations on the evolution of cooperation
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Publication:670827
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2015.08.057zbMath1410.91075OpenAlexW1450981303MaRDI QIDQ670827
Keke Huang, Xiaoping Zheng, Yunpeng Su
Publication date: 20 March 2019
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.08.057
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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- Numerical study of a nuclear fuel element dissipating fission heat into its surrounding fluid medium
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
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