The invisibility hypothesis and promotion efficiency

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00633-DMaRDI QIDQ672911zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Timothy J. Perri

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00633-d

zbMATH Keywords

invisibility hypothesisreverse lemons effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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