Computing constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games

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Publication:681849

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_8zbMATH Open1403.91017arXiv1705.02266OpenAlexW2612502501MaRDI QIDQ681849FDOQ681849


Authors: Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 13 February 2018

Abstract: This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed that there exists a small constant epsilon, such that it is PPAD-complete to find an (unconstrained) epsilon-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game. In the first part of the paper, we show that is NP-hard to decide if a polymatrix game has a constrained approximate equilibrium for 9 natural constraints and any non-trivial approximation guarantee. These results hold even for planar bipartite polymatrix games with degree 3 and at most 7 strategies per player, and all non-trivial approximation guarantees. These results stand in contrast to similar results for bimatrix games, which obviously need a non-constant number of actions, and which rely on stronger complexity-theoretic conjectures such as the exponential time hypothesis. In the second part, we provide a deterministic QPTAS for interaction graphs with bounded treewidth and with logarithmically many actions per player that can compute constrained approximate equilibria for a wide family of constraints that cover many of the constraints dealt with in the first part.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.02266




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