Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

DOI10.1007/S11238-017-9627-7MaRDI QIDQ683517zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nejat Anbarci, Jaideep Roy

Publication date 8 February 2018

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://dro.dur.ac.uk/26049/1/26049.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

balanced budgetdouble auctions (DA)efficiencyno-loss constraint (NLC)sunspotsuniform price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A dominant strategy double auction
• A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams

Cited in

(4)

• A dominant strategy double auction
• SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
• Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions
• A generalized trade reduction mechanism

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