Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
From MaRDI portal
Publication:688894
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1056zbMath0787.90002MaRDI QIDQ688894
Michel Le Breton, Larry G. Epstein
Publication date: 1 November 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1056
91B06: Decision theory
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