On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.060MaRDI QIDQ694945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kjell Hausken

Publication date 19 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.060

zbMATH Keywords

conflictproductionrent seekingtwo efforts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction
• Group size and group success in conflicts
• The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
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Cites work

• Group contest success functions

Cited in

(3)

• The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
• Group contest success function: the heterogeneous individuals case
• The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction

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