Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2891MaRDI QIDQ697849zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Publication date 17 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2891

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Price competition for an informed buyer
• Dynamic price competition
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication

Cites work

• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(4)

• Strategic buyers and privately observed prices
• Buyer groups as strategic commitments
• Private monitoring in auctions
• Price experimentation with strategic buyers

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