A model of the origins of basic property rights

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.10.008MaRDI QIDQ705870zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Abhinay Muthoo

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8848/1/dp546.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Incentive-compatible agreementsInter-player transfers of outputNatural equilibriumProperty rightsSelf-enforcementState-of-nature

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50)

Recommendations

• On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
• Conflict, private and communal property
• On rights in game forms
• Slavery and Other Property Rights¹
• Growth and insecure private property of capital

Cites work

• Bargaining in a non-stationary environment.
• Commitment and observability in games
• Conflict and distribution
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 733409 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(8)

• Spatial pillage game
• On the social efficiency of conflict
• Conflict, private and communal property
• On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
• Slavery and Other Property Rights¹
• Markets and jungles
• On rights in game forms
• Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports

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