Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001zbMath1117.91331MaRDI QIDQ705896

José Alcalde, Pablo Revilla

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

Stability; Coalition formation; Research teams configurations; Strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B10: Group preferences

Related Items

Unnamed Item, Strategy-proof coalition formation, Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion, Bargaining cum voice, Unique stability in simple coalition formation games, Coalition formation and stability, On top responsiveness and strict core stability, On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games, Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games, Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities, COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY

Cites Work

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• Core in a simple coalition formation game
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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage