Does ignorance promote norm compliance?

DOI10.1007/S10588-009-9061-7zbMATH Open1232.91574OpenAlexW2170538486MaRDI QIDQ707709FDOQ707709

Authors: Patrick Groeber, Heiko Rauhut 

Publication date: 8 October 2010

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/156445

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zbMATH Keywords

controlself-fulfilling prophecycrimepunishmentsocial normsdark figure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms

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