Does ignorance promote norm compliance?

DOI10.1007/S10588-009-9061-7MaRDI QIDQ707709zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Groeber, Heiko Rauhut

Publication date 8 October 2010

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/156445

zbMATH Keywords

controlcrimedark figurepunishmentself-fulfilling prophecysocial norms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 862970 (Why is no real title available?)

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