Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0462-9MaRDI QIDQ708887zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors G. Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder

Publication date 15 October 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3442/1/medias/doc/by/de_donder/repeated.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A positive theory of income taxation
• Voting over income taxation
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

Cites work

• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Voting over income taxation

Cited in

(7)

• Voting over income taxation
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
• A positive theory of income taxation
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition

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