Pure strategy equilibria in Bertrand games with discontinuous demand and asymmetric tie-breaking rules

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.016zbMATH Open1196.91011OpenAlexW2072853799MaRDI QIDQ709075FDOQ709075

Authors: A. Bagh 

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.016

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zbMATH Keywords

tie-breaking rulesBertrand gamesstrictly convex costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches
• Winner-take-all price competition
• Bertrand games and sharing rules

Cited In (9)

• Ambiguity and price competition
• Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: a synthesis
• Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry
• Price competition or price leadership
• Bertrand games and sharing rules
• Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games
• Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization
• On the existence of equilibrium points in a class of asymmetric market entry games
• A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints

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