Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

DOI10.1007/S11238-009-9157-ZzbMATH Open1232.91166OpenAlexW2167485117MaRDI QIDQ719049FDOQ719049

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 27 September 2011

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96031

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet criterionerosion of majority principlemajority decisivenessthe Borda method of counts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Condorcet's paradox
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• The Borda dictionary
• The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

Cited In (3)

• The Borda and Condorcet principles: Three medieval applications
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg

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