Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
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Publication:733786
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0330-zzbMath1184.91042WikidataQ57921094 ScholiaQ57921094MaRDI QIDQ733786
Bianca Rundshagen, Michael Finus
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0330-z
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