Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0330-zzbMath1184.91042WikidataQ57921094 ScholiaQ57921094MaRDI QIDQ733786

Bianca Rundshagen, Michael Finus

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0330-z

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formation; strong Nash equilibrium; two-stage game; exclusive membership game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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