Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0330-ZzbMATH Open1184.91042OpenAlexW1995808360WikidataQ57921094 ScholiaQ57921094MaRDI QIDQ733786FDOQ733786

Authors: Michael Finus, Bianca Rundshagen 

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0330-z

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zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationstrong Nash equilibriumtwo-stage gameexclusive membership game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stable Cartels
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment
• A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria

Cited In (11)

• The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go
• Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations
• Collaborative environmental management: a review of the literature
• Global refunding and climate change
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• On the computation of stability in multiple coalition formation games
• Overlapping climate clubs: self-enforcing R\&D networks to mitigate global warming
• Models of endogenous coalition formation between fiscal and monetary authorities in the presence of a monetary union
• Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
• The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances

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