Dynamic adjustment: an electoral method for relaxed double proportionality

DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1484-3zbMATH Open1303.91146arXiv1310.8146OpenAlexW2095111986MaRDI QIDQ744676FDOQ744676

Authors: Svante Linusson, Gustav Ryd 

Publication date: 26 September 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We describe an electoral system for distributing seats in a parliament. It gives proportionality for the political parties and close to proportionality for constituencies. The system suggested here is a version of the system used in Sweden and other Nordic countries with permanent seats in each constituency and adjustment seats to give proportionality on the national level. In the national election of 2010 the current Swedish system failed to give proportionality between parties. We examine here one possible cure for this unwanted behavior. The main difference compared to the current Swedish system is that the number of adjustment seats is not fixed, but rather dynamically determined to be as low as possible and still insure proportionality between parties.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.8146

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Proportional representation in variable-size legislatures
• The probability of the Alabama paradox

Cited In (3)

• Evaluation and possible improvements of the Swedish electoral system
• The electoral system for the Italian senate: an analogy with deterministic chaos?
• Double proportionality for the European Parliament: the tandem system

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