Differential games with asymmetric and correlated information

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Publication:747904

DOI10.1007/S13235-014-0131-1zbMATH Open1325.49045arXiv1403.7498OpenAlexW2014252823MaRDI QIDQ747904FDOQ747904


Authors: Miquel Oliu-Barton Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 19 October 2015

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Differential games with asymmetric information were introduced by Cardaliaguet (2007). As in repeated games with lack of information on both sides (Aumann and Maschler (1995)), each player receives a private signal (his type) before the game starts and has a prior belief about his opponent's type. Then, a differential game is played in which the dynamic and the payoff function depend on both types: each player is thus partially informed about the differential game that is played. The existence of the value function and some characterizations have been obtained under the assumption that the signals are drawn independently. In this paper, we drop this assumption and extend these two results to the general case of correlated types. This result is then applied to repeated games with incomplete information: the characterization of the asymptotic value obtained by Rosenberg and Sorin (2001) and Laraki (2001) for the independent case is extended to the general case.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.7498




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