Linear-quadratic N-person and mean-field games: infinite horizon games with discounted cost and singular limits

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Publication:747906

DOI10.1007/S13235-014-0129-8zbMATH Open1348.91024arXiv1403.4090OpenAlexW2062240654MaRDI QIDQ747906FDOQ747906


Authors: Fabio S. Priuli Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 19 October 2015

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider stochastic differential games with N nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the existence of affine Nash equilibria by means of an associated system of N Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and N Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck partial differential equations, proving that for small discount factors quadratic-Gaussian solutions exist and are unique. Then, we prove the convergence of such solutions to the unique quadratic-Gaussian solution of the pair of Mean Field equations. We also discuss some singular limits, such as vanishing noise, cheap control and vanishing discount.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.4090




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