A note on manipulability of large voting schemes

DOI10.1007/BF00139450MaRDI QIDQ755418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bezalel Peleg

Publication date 1979

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00139450

zbMATH Keywords

large voting schemesmanipulable voting processmanipulationmisrepresentation of preferencesrandom samplingrepresentable voting processsocial choicestatistical point of viewvoting processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Consistent Voting Systems
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Positionalist voting functions
• Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

Cited in

(9)

• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule

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