Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-IMaRDI QIDQ757220zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 1990

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-i

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationendogeneous delayed entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• The chain store paradox

Cited in

(8)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944104 (Why is no real title available?)
• Market entry dynamics with a second-mover advantage
• Patience is a virtue: the effect of slack on competitiveness for admission control
• Continuous time vs. backward induction
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841903 (Why is no real title available?)
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

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