Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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Cites work
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(8)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944104 (Why is no real title available?)
- Market entry dynamics with a second-mover advantage
- Patience is a virtue: the effect of slack on competitiveness for admission control
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841903 (Why is no real title available?)
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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