Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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Publication:757220
DOI10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-IzbMATH Open0722.90015OpenAlexW2018421378MaRDI QIDQ757220FDOQ757220
Authors: Barton L. Lipman 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(90)90038-i
Recommendations
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)
Cites Work
- The chain store paradox
- The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
- Sequential Equilibria
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
- Dynamic limit pricing and internal finance
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry
Cited In (8)
- Patience is a virtue: the effect of slack on competitiveness for admission control
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- Market entry dynamics with a second-mover advantage
- Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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