A note on taxation, incentives and risk sharing

DOI10.1016/0167-6377(85)90009-4MaRDI QIDQ761230zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dominique Thon

Publication date 1985

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(85)90009-4

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesrisk aversionrisky projectsstochastic dominancetax system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Review text

The necessary and sufficient conditions for a tax system to guarantee the consistency of private and public evaluation of risky projects are derived. A stochastic dominance approach is used.

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Cited in

(1)

• The through-time redistributive effect of income taxation. The intermediate inequality view

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