On Bayesian epistemology of Myerson auction

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-78455-7_14MaRDI QIDQ777293zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiaotie Deng, Kèyù Zhü

Publication date 7 July 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78455-7_14

zbMATH Keywords

statistical learningNash equilibriumBayesian epistemologybidding gameMyerson auctionprobability distribution cheating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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