On Bayesian epistemology of Myerson auction
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-78455-7_14zbMATH Open1446.68137OpenAlexW3199152732MaRDI QIDQ777293FDOQ777293
Authors: Xiaotie Deng, Kèyù Zhü 
Publication date: 7 July 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78455-7_14
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statistical learningNash equilibriumBayesian epistemologybidding gameMyerson auctionprobability distribution cheating
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37) Noncooperative games (91A10)
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