Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior
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Publication:778089
DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00332-0zbMATH Open1437.91345OpenAlexW2948418007WikidataQ126867150 ScholiaQ126867150MaRDI QIDQ778089FDOQ778089
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00332-0
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Cites Work
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- NETWORK FORMATION, COST-SHARING AND ANTI-COORDINATION
Cited In (9)
- Equilibrium analysis and incentive-based control of the anticoordinating networked game dynamics
- A general model of binary opinions updating
- Chaos in a Simple Cellular Automaton Model of a Uniform Society
- Influencing opinion networks: optimization and games
- A survey on nonstrategic models of opinion dynamics
- Binary opinion models of influence and opinion dynamics in social networks
- INSTABILITY OF HUMAN SOCIETIES AS A RESULT OF CONFORMITY
- Threshold models of diffusion and collective behavior
- Large deviations in the social systems with threshold conform behavior
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