An algorithm for strong stability in the student-project allocation problem with ties

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39219-2_31MaRDI QIDQ779238zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sofiat Olaosebikan, David F. Manlove

Publication date 21 July 2020

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.10262, http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/203082/7/203082.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this context. Informally, a matching is strongly stable if there is no student and lecturer $l$ such that if they decide to form a private arrangement outside of the matching via one of $l$'s proposed projects, then neither party would be worse off and at least one of them would strictly improve. We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an instance of SPA-ST. Our algorithm runs in $O(m^2)$ time, where $m$ is the total length of the students' preference lists.

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