Strategic advantages in mean field games with a major player
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Publication:784342
Abstract: This note is concerned with a modeling question arising from the mean field games theory. We show how to model mean field games involving a major player which has a strategic advantage, while only allowing closed loop markovian strategies for all the players. We illustrate this property through three examples.
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Cites work
- Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle
- Mean field games
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- Mean-field games with a major player
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- Probabilistic theory of mean field games with applications I. Mean field FBSDEs, control, and games
- Some remarks on mean field games
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