Dynamic reserves in matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:785541
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105069zbMath1447.91100arXiv2005.01103OpenAlexW3021624403MaRDI QIDQ785541
Publication date: 7 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.01103
Related Items
Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Characterizations of the cumulative offer process ⋮ Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions ⋮ Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts ⋮ Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
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