The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example
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Publication:809850
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90154-DzbMath0732.90011OpenAlexW2000330897MaRDI QIDQ809850
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90154-d
Cites Work
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
- First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
- Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria