The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90154-DMaRDI QIDQ809850zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George J. Mailath

Publication date 1991

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90154-d

zbMATH Keywords

private informationincumbent firmlikelihood of entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

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• Scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859310

Cites work

• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(4)

• Entry detererrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts
• Bidding between incumbent and entrant
• FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE
• A note on free entry under uncertainty: the role of asymmetric information

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