Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:812364
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7zbMath1100.91017MaRDI QIDQ812364
Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle
Publication date: 23 January 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7
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