Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
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Publication:816718
DOI10.1007/S10660-005-6156-1zbMATH Open1125.91326OpenAlexW2053457229MaRDI QIDQ816718FDOQ816718
Publication date: 23 February 2006
Published in: Electronic Commerce Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-005-6156-1
efficiencybidding strategyauctionsmulti-item auctionssubstitutescompetitive pricesdiscrete bid incrementsnash equilibriumsimultaneous ascending auctions
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Auction algorithms for network flow problems: A tutorial introduction
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Internet auctions with many traders
Cited In (4)
Recommendations
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- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient π π
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