Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0569-2MaRDI QIDQ818532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Saltuk Ozerturk

Publication date 21 March 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0569-2

zbMATH Keywords

HedgingLiquidityManagerial compensationPay-performance sensitivitySystematic risk.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260087
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
• Acquisition of information to diversify contractual risk

Cited in

(7)

• Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making
• Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
• Acquisition of information to diversify contractual risk
• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260087 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q818532)