Truthful fair division without free disposal
From MaRDI portal
Publication:826615
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01256-0zbMath1454.91103arXiv1804.06923OpenAlexW3106100666WikidataQ100416161 ScholiaQ100416161MaRDI QIDQ826615
Xiaohui Bei, Guangda Huzhang, Warut Suksompong
Publication date: 6 January 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.06923
Related Items (5)
Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX ⋮ Fair cake-cutting in practice ⋮ On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms ⋮ Fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods ⋮ Allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible chores fairly
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Truth, justice, and cake cutting
- Dividing connected chores fairly
- The efficiency of fair division
- Expand the shares together: envy-free mechanisms with a small number of cuts
- Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
- Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
- Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
- Truthful Fair Division
- How to Cut A Cake Fairly
- How to Cut a Cake Fairly
- Four-Person Envy-Free Chore Division
- An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
- Contiguous Cake Cutting: Hardness Results and Approximation Algorithms
- Cake Cutting Algorithms
- A discrete and bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol for four agents
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
This page was built for publication: Truthful fair division without free disposal
