On Lemke processibility of LCP formulations for solving discounted switching control stochastic games
DOI10.1007/S10479-020-03750-1zbMATH Open1467.90079OpenAlexW3083595725MaRDI QIDQ828828FDOQ828828
Authors: N. E. Zubov
Publication date: 5 May 2021
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03750-1
Recommendations
- Linear complementarity and discounted switching controller stochastic games
- Solving subclasses of multi-player stochastic games via linear complementarity problem formulations -- a survey and some new results
- Computing Stationary Nash Equilibria of Undiscounted Single-Controller Stochastic Games
- On solving mean payoff games using pivoting algorithms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067965
linear complementarity problem (LCP)\(E_0\) property (or the class \(E_0\))\(R_0\) property (or the class \(R_0\))discounted switching control stochastic gamesprocessibility by Lemke's algorithmsecondary ray termination
Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Cites Work
- Stochastic Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Complementary pivot theory of mathematical programming
- Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
- The generalized linear complementarity problem revisited
- Pivoting algorithms for some classes of stochastic games: A survey
- An orderfield property for stochastic games when one player controls transition probabilities
- Ordered field property for stochastic games when the player who controls transitions changes from state to state
- Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- Linear complementarity and discounted switching controller stochastic games
- A finite step algorithm via a bimatrix game to a single controller non- zero sum stochastic game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Myopic Solutions of Markov Decision Processes and Stochastic Games
- Some classes of matrices in linear complementarity theory
- Computing Stationary Nash Equilibria of Undiscounted Single-Controller Stochastic Games
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: On Lemke processibility of LCP formulations for solving discounted switching control stochastic games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q828828)