Why males compete rather than care, with an application to supplying collective goods
DOI10.1007/S11538-020-00800-4zbMATH Open1466.92126OpenAlexW3087196270WikidataQ99559078 ScholiaQ99559078MaRDI QIDQ829252FDOQ829252
Authors: Sara L. Loo, Danya Rose, Michael Weight, Kristen Hawkes, Peter S. Kim
Publication date: 5 May 2021
Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-020-00800-4
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