Multilateral subsidy games
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Publication:834724
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0384-2zbMATH Open1172.91005OpenAlexW3122156971WikidataQ59583208 ScholiaQ59583208MaRDI QIDQ834724FDOQ834724
Authors: Dermot Leahy, J. Peter Neary
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0384-2
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Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Multi‐tier pricing in uniform and non‐uniform tax/subsidy systems
- Understanding agreements on TRIPS and subsidies in tandem
- Inefficient lock-in and subsidy competition
- International trade and competitiveness
- A Little Help from My Friend: International Subsidy Games with Isoelastic Demands
- A rationale for the WTO prohibition of export subsidies: Strategic export subsidies and world welfare
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