Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
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Cites work
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
- Stakeholder bargaining games
- Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
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