Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0055-6zbMath1195.91052MaRDI QIDQ839608

Mark Fey, Kristopher W. Ramsay

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0055-6

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; private information; conflict; war; war consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91F10: History, political science

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

Interim third-party selection in bargaining

Cites Work

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