Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
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Publication:847864
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0403-3zbMATH Open1182.91085OpenAlexW2068992686MaRDI QIDQ847864FDOQ847864
Authors: Antonio Miralles 
Publication date: 19 February 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0403-3
Recommendations
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
Cites Work
- Comparative cheap talk
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
Cited In (5)
- Entry, market structures and welfare
- On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
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