Rational choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's stable set: The case of path-dependent procedures
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Publication:857979
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0147-6zbMATH Open1142.91431OpenAlexW2100958488MaRDI QIDQ857979FDOQ857979
Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Kunal Sengupta 
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6
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Cites Work
- Theory of games and economic behavior.
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
- Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
- On the routewise application of choice
- Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence
- The congruence axiom and path independence
Cited In (6)
- On the stability of the \(R\)-rational choice function
- Choice by sequential procedures
- A characterization of path dependent modes of behavior
- Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings
- Revealed VNM-solutions: characterizations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
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