Rational choice and von Neumann-Morgenstern's stable set: The case of path-dependent procedures

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0147-6MaRDI QIDQ857979zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Kunal Sengupta

Publication date 5 January 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0147-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• Choice procedures and rational selections
• Choice by sequential procedures
• On the stability of the \(R\)-rational choice function
• Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

Cites work

• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• On the routewise application of choice
• Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of Sequential Path Independence
• Revealed preference and the axiomatic foundations of intransitive indifference: The case of asymmetric subrelations
• The congruence axiom and path independence
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(6)

• On the stability of the \(R\)-rational choice function
• Choice by sequential procedures
• A characterization of path dependent modes of behavior
• Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• Revealed VNM-solutions: characterizations

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