Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.10.003zbMATHDBLPOpenAlexWikidataMaRDI QIDQ863280FDO

Authors Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck, Thomas D. Jeitschko

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsnetwork externalitiescoordinationcoordination avalancheeconomic collapsesolipsism bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited in

(1)

• Social conformity under evolving private preferences

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