Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.10.003zbMATH Open1153.91501DBLPjournals/geb/GuarinoHJ06OpenAlexW2142677156WikidataQ57443279 ScholiaQ57443279MaRDI QIDQ863280FDOQ863280

Authors: Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck, Thomas D. Jeitschko 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.003

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zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsnetwork externalitiescoordinationcoordination avalancheeconomic collapsesolipsism bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

Cited In (1)

• Social conformity under evolving private preferences

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