Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
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Publication:863283
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.005zbMATH Open1154.91360OpenAlexW3124510813MaRDI QIDQ863283FDOQ863283
Authors: Igal Milchtaich 
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.005
Recommendations
transportation networkscongestionnetwork topologynonatomic gamesexternalitiesBraess's paradoxwardrop equilibriumtopological efficiency
Cites Work
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Cited In (47)
- Fighting for routes: resource allocation among competing planners in transportation networks
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- Negative prices in network pricing games
- Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks
- Monotonicity of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- Inefficiencies in network models: a graph-theoretic perspective
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A polynomial-time algorithm for detecting the possibility of Braess paradox in directed graphs
- Excluding Braess's paradox in nonatomic selfish routing
- Braess's paradox in expanders
- A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares
- Efficient methods for selfish network design
- Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games
- Selfish splittable flows and NP-completeness
- Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
- Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows
- Investment paradoxes in electricity networks
- Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs
- Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
- Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
- Weighted congestion games with separable preferences
- Optimal externalities in a parallel transportation network
- The price of anarchy in nonatomic consumption-relevance congestion games
- The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
- Capacitated network design games
- Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand
- Internalization of social cost in congestion games
- A selective tour through congestion games
- Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
- Braess's paradox for flows over time
- A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games
- Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games
- Social learning in nonatomic routing games
- On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks
- Network characterizations for excluding Braess's paradox
- Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games
- Depletable channels: dynamics, behaviour, and efficiency in network design
- Paradoxes in social networks with multiple products
- The price of anarchy in series-parallel network congestion games
- Network topologies for weakly Pareto optimal nonatomic selfish routing
- Polynomial recognition of vulnerable multi-commodities
- Machine load balancing game with linear externalities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
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