Achievable hierarchies in voting games

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9003-5MaRDI QIDQ867135zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jane Friedman, Lynn McGrath, Cameron Parker

Publication date 14 February 2007

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9003-5

zbMATH Keywords

desirability relationordinal equivalencepower indicesswap robustvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games

Cited in

(22)

• Simple majority achievable hierarchies
• The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
• On the characterization of weighted simple games
• Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games
• Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies
• Hierarchies achievable in simple games
• On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
• Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies. II
• A note on hierarchies in weighted voting games and partitions
• The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik
• The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
• Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
• Hierarchies in voting simple games
• On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
• The influence relation for ternary voting games
• On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
• On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions
• Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
• Power index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota
• Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
• All power structures are achievable in basic weighted games
• Consistent desirability relation in games with multiple levels of approval and achievable hierarchies

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