The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0064-4zbMATH Open1116.91068OpenAlexW2087984340MaRDI QIDQ868616FDOQ868616

İpek Özkal-Sanver, Murat R. Sertel

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0064-4

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zbMATH Keywords

endowments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Core is manipulable via segmentation
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

Cited In (3)

• Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
• Core is manipulable via segmentation
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

Uses Software

• ASSET

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