On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0076-0MaRDI QIDQ868625zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Reijnierse, Mark Voorneveld, Peter Borm

Publication date 6 March 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gameequilibrium selectionleakage of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games
• Commitment and observability in games
• Games with espionage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193411 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information leakage forces cooperation
• Maximal nash subsets for bimatrix games
• On the determinateness of semi-infinite bimatrix games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Potential games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
• Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games

Cited in

(4)

• An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games
• Continuity and equilibrium stability
• Fall back proper equilibrium
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5964918 (Why is no real title available?)

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