Formal correctness of security protocols.

zbMATH Open1176.68026MaRDI QIDQ869815FDOQ869815

Authors: Giampaolo Bella 

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Information Security and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

fairnessverificationconfidentialityreliabilityeventauthenticationtraceinspectionIsabelleagentnon-repudiationsecurity protocoltheorem proverunicityaccountabilityinductive methodguaranteecryptographic keycertified e-mailcompromised agentKerberosmessageNeedham-Schroeder keynoncesreceptionShoup-Rubin protocolsmartcardsspytheory hierarchythreat modeltimestampingTMN protocolWoo-Lam protocolZhou-Gollmann

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Cryptography (94A60) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62) Network protocols (68M12)

Cited In (9)

• Multi-attacker protocol validation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Inductive Proofs of Computational Secrecy
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Handbook of Formal Analysis and Verification in Cryptography
• Formal analysis of Kerberos 5
• Soft constraint programming to analysing security protocols
• Automated type-based analysis of injective agreement in the presence of compromised principals
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Uses Software

• Casper

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